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Abstract
Human-level AI will be achieved, but new ideas are almost certainly needed, so a date cannot be reliably predicted—maybe five
years, maybe five hundred years. I’d be inclined to bet on this 21st century.
It is not surprising that human-level AI has proved difficult and progress has been slow—though there has been important
progress. The slowness and the demand to exploit what has been discovered has led many to mistakenly redefine AI, sometimes in
ways that preclude human-level AI—by relegating to humans parts of the task that human-level computer programs would have to
do. In the terminology of this paper, it amounts to settling for a bounded informatic situation instead of the more general common
sense informatic situation.
Overcoming the “brittleness” of present AI systems and reaching human-level AI requires programs that deal with the common
sense informatic situation—in which the phenomena to be taken into account in achieving a goal are not fixed in advance.
We discuss reaching human-level AI, emphasizing logical AI and especially emphasizing representation problems of information
and of reasoning. Ideas for reasoning in the common sense informatic situation include nonmonotonic reasoning, approximate
concepts, formalized contexts and introspection.
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1. What is human-level AI?
The first scientific discussion of human level machine intelligence was apparently by Alan Turing in the lec-
ture [35]. The notion was amplified as a goal in [34], but at least the latter paper did not say what would have to be
done to achieve the goal.
Allen Newell and Herbert Simon in 1954 were the first people to make a start on programming computers for
general intelligence. They were over-optimistic, because their idea of what has to be done to achieve human-level
intelligence was inadequate. The General Problem Solver (GPS) took general problem solving to be the task of
transforming one expression into another using an allowed set of transformations.
Many tasks that humans can do, humans cannot yet make computers do. There are two approaches to human-
level AI, but each presents difficulties. It isn’t a question of deciding between them, because each should eventually
succeed; it is more a race.
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sufficient ability to observe ourselves or others to understand directly how our intellects work. Understanding the
human brain well enough to imitate its function therefore requires theoretical and experimental success in psy-
chology and neurophysiology.1 See [28] for the beginning of the information processing approach to psychology.
2. To the extent that we understand the problems achieving goals in the world presents to intelligence we can write
intelligent programs. That’s what this article is about.
Much of the public recognition of AI has been for programs with a little bit of AI and a lot of computing. This
succeeded for chess and checkers and has so far failed for the game of go. Go requires the identification of
subpositions that are analyzed separately first and then in interaction with each other. Human chess players also
do this, but the chess programs don’t. The price of the much greater computation this makes necessary has been
affordable in chess but not in go. Computer speed bypasses many other heuristics that save humans enormous
computation.
What problems does the world present to intelligence? More narrowly, we consider the problems it would present
to a human scale robot faced with the problems humans might be inclined to relegate to sufficiently intelligent ro-
bots. The physical world of a robot contains middle sized objects about which its sensory apparatus can obtain only
partial information quite inadequate to fully determine the effects of its future actions. Its mental world includes its
interactions with people and also meta-information about the information it has or can obtain.
Our approach is based on what we call the common sense informatic situation, which we contrast with the bounded
informatic situation that characterizes both formal scientific theories and almost all (maybe all) experimental work in
AI done so far.
A formal theory in the physical sciences deals with a bounded informatic situation. Scientists decide informally in
advance what phenomena to take into account. For example, much celestial mechanics is done within the Newtonian
gravitational theory and does not take into account possible additional effects such as outgassing from a comet or
electromagnetic forces exerted by the solar wind. If more phenomena are to be considered, a person must make a new
theory. Probabilistic and fuzzy uncertainties can still fit into a bounded informatic system; it is only necessary that the
set of possibilities (sample space) be bounded.
Most AI formalisms also work only in a bounded informatic situation. What phenomena to take into account is
decided by a person before the formal theory is constructed. With such restrictions, much of the reasoning can be
monotonic, but such systems cannot reach human level ability. For that, the machine will have to decide for itself
what information is relevant. When a bounded informatic system is appropriate, the system must construct or choose
a limited context containing a suitable theory whose predicates and functions connect to the machine’s inputs and
outputs in an appropriate way.2 The logical tool for bounding the informatic situation is nonmonotonic reasoning.
2. The common sense informatic situation
Contention: The key to reaching human-level AI is making systems that operate successfully in the common sense
informatic situation.
In general a thinking human is in what we call the common sense informatic situation [13]. It is more general than
any bounded informatic situation. The known facts are incomplete, and there is no a priori limitation on what facts are
relevant. It may not even be decided in advance what phenomena are to be taken into account. The consequences of
actions cannot be fully determined. The common sense informatic situation necessitates the use of approximate con-
cepts that cannot be fully defined and the use of approximate theories involving them. It also requires nonmonotonic
reasoning in reaching conclusions.
The common sense informatic situation also includes some knowledge about the system’s mental state.
1 Recent work with positron emission tomography has identified areas of the brain that consume more glucose when a person is doing mental
arithmetic. This knowledge will help build AI systems only when it becomes possible to observe what is going on in these areas during mental
arithmetic.
2 The textbook [4] puts it this way. “To get human-level computational intelligence it must be the agent itself that decides how to divide up the
world, and which relationships to reason about”.
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Physics some years ago. It discussed grading answers to a physics problem. The exam problem is to find the height of
a building using a barometer. The intended solution is to measure the air pressure at the top and bottom of the building
and multiply the difference by the ratio of the density of mercury to the density of air.
However, other answers may be offered. (1) Drop the barometer from the top of the building and measure the time
before it hits the ground. (2) Measure the height and length of the shadow of the barometer and measure the length
of the shadow of the building. (3) Rappel down the building using the barometer as a measuring rod. (4) Lower the
barometer on a string till it reaches the ground and measure the string. (5) Offer the barometer to the janitor of the
building in exchange for information about the height. (6) Ignore the barometer, count the stories of the building and
multiply by ten feet.
Clearly it is not possible to bound in advance the common sense knowledge of the world that may be relevant to
grading the problem. Grading some of the solutions requires knowledge of the formalisms of physics and the physical
facts about the earth, e.g. the law of falling bodies or the variation of air pressure with altitude. However, in every case,
the physics knowledge is embedded in common sense knowledge. Thus before one can use Galileo’s law of falling
bodies s = 12gt2, one needs common sense information about buildings, their shapes and their roofs.
Bounded informatic situations are obtained by nonmonotonically inferring that only the phenomena that somehow
appear to be relevant are relevant. In the barometer example, the student was expected to infer that the barometer was
only to be used in the conventional way for measuring air pressure. For example, a reasoning system might do this by
applying circumscription to a predicate relevant in a formalism containing also metalinguistic information, e.g. that
this was a problem assigned in a physics course. Formalizing relevance in a useful way promises to be more difficult
than just using existing relevance logics.
Common sense facts and common sense reasoning are necessarily imprecise. The imprecision necessitated by the
common sense informatic situation applies to computer programs as well as to people.
Some kinds of imprecision can be represented numerically and have been explored with the aid of Bayesian net-
works, fuzzy logic and similar formalisms. This is in addition to the study of approximation in numerical analysis and
the physical sciences.
3. The use of mathematical logic
What about mathematical logical languages?
Mathematical logic was devised to formalize precise facts and correct reasoning. Its founders, Leibniz, Boole and
Frege, hoped to use it for common sense facts and reasoning, not realizing that the imprecision of concepts used in
common sense language was often a necessary feature and not always a bug. The biggest success of mathematical
logic was in formalizing purely mathematical theories for which imprecise concepts are unneeded. Since the common
sense informatic situation requires using imprecise facts and imprecise reasoning, the use of mathematical logic for
common sense has had limited success. This has caused many people to give up. Others devise extended logical
languages and even extended forms of mathematical logic.
It is necessary to distinguish between mathematical logic and particular mathematical logical languages. Particular
logical languages are determined by a particular choice of concepts and the predicate and function symbols to represent
them. Failure to make the distinction has led some people to conclude that logic is inadequate when all they have shown
is that a particular language is inadequate for some purpose. Different concepts and different predicate and function
symbols might still succeed. In the words of the drive-in movie critic of Grapevine, Texas, “I’m surprised I have to
explain this stuff.”
The pessimists about logic or some particular set of predicates might try to prove a theorem about its inadequacies
for expressing common sense.3
Since it seems clear that humans don’t use logic as a basic internal representation formalism, maybe something
else will work better for AI. Researchers have been trying to find this something else since the 1950s but still haven’t
succeeded in getting anything that is ready to be applied to the common sense informatic situation. Maybe they will
eventually succeed. However, I think the problems listed in the later sections of this article will arise in any approach
to human-level AI.
3 Gödel’s theorem is not relevant to this, because the question is not one of decideability or of characterizing truth.
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use logic as a basic AI formalism make programs reason logically. However, we have to extend logic and extend the
programs that use it in various ways.
One important extension was the development of modal logic starting in the 1920s and using it to treat modalities
like knowledge, belief and obligation. Modalities can be treated either by using modal logic or by reifying concepts
and sentences within the standard logic. My opinion is that reification in standard logic is more powerful and will
work better.
A second extension was the formalization of nonmonotonic reasoning beginning in the late 1970s—with circum-
scription and default logic and their variants as the major proposals. Nonmonotonic logic has been studied both as
pure mathematics and in application to AI problems, most prominently to the formalization of action and causality.
Several variants of the major formalisms have been devised.
Success so far has been moderate, and it isn’t clear whether greater success can be obtained by changing the
concepts and their representation by predicate and function symbols or by varying the nonmonotonic formalism.4
We need to distinguish the actual use of logic from what Allen Newell, [26] and [27], calls the logic level and
which was also proposed in [8].
4. Approximate concepts and approximate theories
Other kinds of imprecision are more fundamental for intelligence than numerical imprecision. Many phenomena
in the world are appropriately described in terms of approximate concepts. Although the concepts are imprecise,
many statements using them have precise truth values. We offer two examples: the concept of Mount Everest and the
concept of the welfare of a chicken. The exact pieces of rock and ice that constitute Mount Everest are unclear. For
many rocks, there is no truth of the matter as to whether it is part of Mount Everest. Nevertheless, it is true without
qualification that Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Norgay climbed Mount Everest in 1953 and that John McCarthy never
set foot on it.
The point of this example is that it is possible and even common to have a solid knowledge structure from which
solid conclusions can be inferred based on a foundation built on the quicksand of approximate concepts without
definite extensions.
As for the chicken, it is clear that feeding it helps it and wringing its neck harms it, but it is unclear what its
welfare consists of over the course of the decade from the time of its hatching. Is it better off leading a life of poultry
luxury and eventually being slaughtered or would it be better off escaping the chicken yard and taking its chances on
starvation and foxes? There is no truth of the matter to be determined by careful investigation of chickens. When a
concept is inherently approximate, it is a waste of time to try to give it a precise definition. Indeed different efforts to
define such a concept precisely will lead to different results—if any.
Most human common sense knowledge involves approximate concepts, and reaching human-level AI requires a
satisfactory way of representing information involving approximate concepts. McCarthy in [22] discusses how to do
it in logic. A simple approach would involve giving necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for a rock to be
part of Mount Everest but not to try for necessary and sufficient conditions.
5. Nonmonotonic reasoning
Common sense reasoning is also imprecise in that it draws conclusions that might not be made if there were more
information. Thus common sense reasoning is nonmonotonic. I will not go into the details of any of the proposals for
handling nonmonotonic reasoning.
In particular, getting from the common sense informatic situation to a bounded informatic situation needs non-
monotonic reasoning.
4 One referee for KR96 foolishly and arrogantly proposed rejecting a paper on the grounds that the inadequacy of circumscription for representing
action was known.
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Human abilities in the common sense informatic situation also include what may be called elaboration tolerance—
the ability to elaborate a statement of some facts without having to start all over. Thus when we begin to think about a
problem, e.g. determining the height of a building, we form a bounded context and try to solve the problem within it.
However, at any time more facts can be added, e.g. about the precision with which the time for the barometer to fall
can be estimated using a stop watch and also the possibilities of acquiring a stop watch.
McCarthy in [21] discusses about 20 elaborations of the Missionaries and Cannibals problem—mostly informally.
Lifschitz in [6] formalizes nine of them.
7. Formalization of context
A third extension of mathematical logic involves formalizing the notion of context [16]. Notice that when theories
are used in human communication and study, the theory is used in a context which people can discuss from the
outside. If computers are to have this facility and are to work within logic, then the “outer” logical language needs
names for contexts and sentences giving their relations and a way of entering a context. Clearly human-level AI
requires reasoning about context.
Human-level AI also requires the ability to transcend the outermost context the system has used so far. Besides in
[17], this is also discussed in [20].
Further work includes [1] and [2].
8. Reasoning about events—especially actions
Reasoning about actions has been a major AI activity, but this paper will not discuss my or other people’s current
formalisms, concentrating instead on the long range problem of reaching human level capability. We regard actions
as particular kinds of events and therefore propose subsuming reasoning about actions under the heading of reasoning
about events.
Most reasoning about events has concerned determining the effects of an explicitly given sequence of actions by a
single actor. Within this framework various problems have been studied.
• The frame problem concerns not having to state what does not change when an event occurs.
• The qualification problem concerns not having to state all the preconditions of an action or other event. The point
is both to limit the set of preconditions and also to jump to the conclusion that unstated others will be fulfilled
unless there is evidence to the contrary. For example, wearing clothes is a precondition for airline travel, but the
travel agent will not tell his customer to be sure to wear clothes.
• The ramification problem concerns how to treat side-effects of events other than the principal effect mentioned in
the event description.
Each of these involves elaboration tolerance, e.g. adding descriptions of the effects of additional events without having
to change the descriptions of the events already described. When I wrote about applications of circumscription to
formalizing common sense [11], I hoped that a simple abnormality theory would suffice for all of them. That didn’t
work out when I tried it, but I still think a common nonmonotonic reasoning mechanism will work. Costello in [3]
argues that simple abnormality theories have the same expressive power as more elaborate nonmonotonic formalisms
that have been proposed.
Human level intelligence requires reasoning about strategies of action, i.e. action programs. It also requires con-
sidering multiple actors and also concurrent events and continuous events. Clearly we have a long way to go.
Some of these points are discussed in [19] which concerns elaborating a simple narrative involving two actors.
9. Introspection and self-awareness
People have a limited ability to observe their own mental processes. For many intellectual tasks introspection is
irrelevant. However, it is at least relevant for evaluating how one is using one’s own thinking time. Human-level AI will
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both in source and compiled form and also reason about the current values of the variables in the program. McCarthy
in [20] discusses this in some detail.
That robots also need introspection is argued, and how to do it is also discussed in [20].
10. Heuristics
The largest qualitative gap between human performance and computer performance is in the area of heuristics,
even though the gap is disguised in many applications by the millions-fold speed advantage of computers. The general
purpose theorem proving programs run very slowly, and the special purpose programs are very specialized in their
heuristics.
I think the problem lies in our present inability to give programs domain and problem dependent heuristic advice.
In [7] I advertised that the Advice Taker would express its heuristics declaratively. For more than 40 years I did not
know how to do it.
Recently Josefina Sierra-Santibanez made important theoretical and experimental progress in controlling planning
with declaratively expressed heuristics. The work is reported in [32] and [33] which show the advantage of using
declarative heuristics over other approaches, specifically in blocks world problems.
Here are some ideas I hope are relevant starting with a simple example and then introducing the more general idea
but still limited idea of postponable variables.
McCarthy in [10] discusses coloring maps with four colors in terms of modifying a Prolog program for map
coloring. It is simply exemplified in terms of coloring a map of the United States. Note that California (CA) has only
three neighbors—Arizona (AZ), Nevada (NV), and Oregon (OR). Therefore, we postpone coloring CA the resulting
reduced map has been colored. Then we can always find a color for CA, different from those used to color AZ, NV,
and OR. The process of reducing the map can be continued, because once CA has been removed, AZ has only three
neighbors. Eventually we get a completely reduced map in which every state has four or more neighbors. It turns out
that the completely reduced map of the USA is empty. Postponement thereby eliminates tree search from the problem
of coloring the map of the US.
In fact the completely reduced maps of Europe and Asia, South America, Africa, and the departments of France
are also empty. I have not found any actual political maps on the earth that don’t reduce completely, even though it is
not difficult to make an artificial map in which each country has four or more neighbors.5
10.1. Postponable variables
Map coloring provides a nice example of the notion of postponable variable in constraint satisfaction problems.
Definition 1. A constraint satisfaction problem CSP consists of a set VV of variables and a set C of constraint relations
among the variables that are required to be satisfied.
Definition 2. A variable v in CSP is postponable iff no matter how the constraints C \ Constraints-involving(v) that
do not involve the variable are satisfied, there is always a value for v that conjoined to the values of the variables
satisfies all the constraints.
Here’s a formula expressing the notion of a variable v being postponable in a constraint satisfaction problem dcsp.
In (1) the variables of csp are represented by constants, e.g. in coloring the US. CA is a constant representing a variable
ca. We use vv as a meta-variable ranging over the variables of csp.
Postponable(vv, csp) := (∀as)(Satisfies(as,Remove(vv, csp))
→ (∃x ∈ Domain(csp))Satisfies(as + Set(vv, x), csp)). (1)
5 McCarthy [10] also discusses postponing countries with four or fewer neighbors and how to use the topology to fix the situation that arise when
it is necessary to color a country all four of whose neighbors have been assigned distinct colors.
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volving vv. Satisfies(as, csp) says that the assignment as of values to variables satisfies the constraint problem csp.
Domain(csp) is the domain over which the variables of csp range. as + Set(v, x) is the assignment of values to vari-
ables obtained from as by adding the assignment of x to the variable that is the value of vv.
Notice that the concepts involved in defining Postponable are all metamathematical with respect to the original
constraint satisfaction problem. The ability to work at the metalevel will be essential to human-level AI.
I hope that the methods described by Sierra will be applicable to expressing the use of postponability in constraint
satisfaction problems.
11. Psychological, social and political obstacles
The computer science world is still suffering from a 1990s fit of pseudo-practicality that is inimical to the solution
of difficult scientific problems. Lip service is given to basic research, and a lot of basic research is done, but the
initiation of ambitious research by young people is hampered by the now prevalent doctrine that “basic research”
should be done in connection with applied problems that have been identified by the competent committees. I think
that Newell and Minsky and I would have had a much harder time initiating AI research if the atmosphere of the 1950s
had been like that of the 1990s.
Computer science suffers more than older fields from this disease, one of the main carriers of which was the Com-
puter Science and Telecommunications Board of the National Research Council. Its worst sin was merging computer
science with computer engineering in its harmful, narrow-minded report Computing the Future [30].
Nevertheless, the main problem in reaching human level AI is not the politics of science and technology but the
intrinsic difficulty of the scientific problems.
11.1. Philosophical and ideological objections to AI
From the beginning, the idea of artificial intelligence has encountered philosophical and ideological objections.
Turing [34] deals with many of them, properly dividing the objectors into those who think human-level performance
is impossible and those who think that a machine wouldn’t be really intelligent even if you couldn’t distinguish its
performance from that of a human.
Hubert Dreyfus [5] is in the first category, John Searle [31] is in the second. Roger Penrose [29] took an intermediate
position, arguing from Gödel’s incompleteness theorems that a computer built in accordance with the present laws of
physics couldn’t be intelligent, but appealing to ideas of quantum gravity that he couldn’t specify that material systems,
e.g. humans, could be intelligent. See [15] and [18] discuss Penrose’s arguments and related questions.
Some of the objections to AI have been frankly religious. However, as with objectors to evolution, the religious
objectors to AI use whatever material they can find from Dreyfus, Searle, Penrose and others. AI researchers should
feel relieved that the attacks on AI have been nowhere near as fierce as those on evolution. Maybe it’s because human-
level AI is not discussed in high school texts on programming and computer science.
I don’t want to go further into the objections in this article.
12. Conclusion
Between us and human-level intelligence lie many problems. They can be summarized as that of succeeding in the
common sense informatic situation.
The problems include:
common sense knowledge of the world Many important aspects of what this knowledge is in and how it can be repre-
sented are still unsolved questions. This is particularly true of knowledge of the effects of actions and other
events.
epistemologically adequate languages These are languages for expressing what a person or robot can actually learn
about the world. McCarthy and Hayes [25] discusses epistemological adequacy, note that a language ex-
pressing facts in terms of positions and velocities of molecules is not adequate.
concepts regarded as objects Humans do it. McCarthy [9] formalizes it.
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nonmonotonic reasoning Perhaps new systems are needed, but maybe it is only a question of circumscribing the right
formulas, varying the right predicates and functions. See [12].
contexts as objects This subject is just beginning. See the references of Section 7.
introspection AI systems will need to examine their own internal states. See [20].
action The present puzzles of formalizing action should admit a uniform solution. A new version of situation cal-
culus is discussed in [23].
I doubt that a human-level intelligent program needs structures corresponding to all these entities and to the
others that might have been listed. A generally intelligent logical program probably needs only its monotonic and
nonmonotonic reasoning mechanisms plus mechanisms for entering and leaving contexts. The rest are handled by
particular functions and predicates.
To what extent will all these problems have to be faced explicitly by people working with neural nets and connec-
tionist systems? The systems I know about are too primitive for the problems even to arise. However, more ambitious
systems will inhabit the common sense informatic situation. They will have to be elaboration tolerant and will require
some kind of mental model of the consequences of actions.
Many will find dismayingly large the list of tasks that must be accomplished in order to reach human-level logical
intelligence. Perhaps fewer but more powerful ideas would simplify the list. Others will claim that a system that
evolves intelligence as life does will be more straightforward to build. Maybe, but the advocates of that approach have
been at it as long as we have and still aren’t even close.
So it’s a race.
It will be much more scientifically satisfying to understand human level artificial intelligence logically than just
achieve it by a computerized evolutionary process that produced an intelligent but incomprehensible result. In fact,
the logical approach would be worth pursuing even if the intellectually lazier evolutionary approach won the race.
12.1. What will humanity do with human-level AI?
Here is where science fiction has had more to say than science, but it fictionalizes the science for literary objectives
and social agendas. These have mainly involved assuming human-like personalities including good and bad behavior
and suffering persecution and/or psychological problems like humans. There is no need to give AI systems human-like
personalities, and they should be designed so as to excite neither fear nor sympathy.
When human-level AI becomes available, it is unlikely to be the monopoly of any group or government. Many
individuals and groups will use it to advance their goals.
As early as 1970 some wanted international regulation of AI. This was a bad idea then and will remain a bad idea
as long as we have so little understanding of what form human-level AI will take.
I’d like to have a robot servant, and if I had access to a human-level system I’d ask it for help in understanding the
consequences for humanity of various policies about AI.
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